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Encouraging Insurers to Regulate: 
The Role (If Any) for Tort Law 
 
Kyle D. Logue* 
Insurance companies are financially responsible for a substantial 
portion of the losses associated with risky activities in the economy. The 
more insurers can lower the risks posed by their insureds, the more 
competitively they can price their policies, and the more customers they can 
attract. Thus, competition forces insurers to be private regulators of risk. 
To that end, insurers deploy a range of techniques to encourage their 
insureds to reduce the risks of their insured activities, from charging 
experience-rated premiums to discounting premium rates for insureds who 
make specific behavioral changes designed to reduce risk. Somewhat 
paradoxically, however, tort law discourages insurers from engaging in the 
direct regulation of their insureds’ behavior. Under long-standing tort 
principles, if an insurer “undertakes” to provide serious risk-reduction 
services to its insured, the insurer can be found to have a duty of reasonable 
care in performing such services and, should that duty be breached, held 
liable for any harms caused to third parties. This application of tort 
principles to insurance companies could be contributing to the moral 
hazard problem often associated with insurance—the tendency of insurance 
to cause risk to increase rather than decrease. This Article explores this 
problem and analyzes a number of ways to encourage insurers to 
regulate—from insurer-specific Good Samaritan statutes (which we might 
call “carrots”) to the creation of an affirmative duty on the part of insurers 
to regulate through the expansion of tort liability (which would definitely 
be a “stick”). What combination of carrots and sticks produces the 
optimal insurer incentives to regulate their insureds’ behavior? That is the 
question this Article addresses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that insurance companies are financial intermediaries that 
transfer and distribute risk. Specifically, insurers enter into contractual 
arrangements with risk-averse individuals and corporations in which liability for an 
agreed-upon set of hazards is shifted from the latter to the former. The insurers, 
who themselves are corporations owned by private shareholders, spread this risk 
across their policyholders through premiums that reflect each policyholder’s risk. 
Thus, each policyholder pays a relatively small and certain premium to the pool in 
exchange for the pool absorbing the risks of large losses. The risk-transferring and 
risk-spreading functions compose the standard picture of insurance markets. 
But insurers do more than this. Insurance companies also serve as active risk 
regulators.1 In many of the same ways that government agencies monitor and 
place limits on the risky behaviors of individuals and businesses within their 
jurisdictions, insurance companies also monitor and place limits on the risky 
behavior of their insureds. Because insurance is a practical necessity for certain 
activities, if not a legal one, insurers for those activities function as gatekeepers, 
determining who gets to engage in the risky activity. Homeownership, for 
example, is not possible for most people without home-mortgage financing, 
which in turn is not available to anyone who does not first purchase homeowners 
insurance. Similarly, one cannot legally drive a car in most states without first 
purchasing the statutory minimum amount of liability insurance. It is also difficult, 
if not impossible, to be actively engaged in some professions—law, medicine, 
engineering, etc.—if one does not have professional-liability insurance coverage, 
purchased either individually or through one’s employer. 
 
1. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012). 
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In addition to regulating entry into much commercial activity, insurers also 
have more subtle regulatory tools. For example, auto insurers charge higher 
premiums for vehicles that pose a statistically greater chance of being involved in 
an accident, are more likely to cause harm to others if an accident occurs, or are 
more expensive to repair. Such risk-sensitive premiums create incentives at the 
margins for auto purchasers to take into account the risks associated with their 
vehicle choices. Likewise, when auto insurance companies adjust premiums based 
on the driving histories of individual drivers, the way in which drivers operate 
their vehicles, or the number of miles the insured drives, the insurer is, in effect, 
regulating driver behavior and forcing drivers to internalize the expected value of 
the accident costs associated with their driving choices. In this way, insurance 
premiums can be viewed as cost-internalizing Pigouvian taxes similar to taxes on 
carbon emissions, but here they are administered by private insurance companies 
rather than by a government agency. 
An argument can be made that this is all beneficial. We should want insurers 
to act as risk regulators; private regulation is sometimes needed, whether because 
of externalities, cognitive biases, or some other market failure. Moreover, there are 
times when private regulation through insurance can be superior to government 
regulation. This happens when insurers are able to utilize their two primary 
institutional advantages over government regulators. First, private insurers have 
relatively cheap access to highly relevant risk-related information. Second, private 
insurers are motivated by profit to find clever and practical ways to reduce risks. 
These two factors explain why regulation by insurance is not only common, but 
why it is often desirable. 
However, there is one type of regulation by insurers that is surprisingly 
uncommon. It is analogous to what might be called “direct regulation,” “input 
regulation,” or “command-and-control regulation” in the government regulation 
context.2 For example, after the EPA inspects a coal-fired power plant, it might 
issue an order specifying steps that the plant’s operator must take to reduce 
harmful airborne emissions; such an intervention is a quintessential example of 
direct regulation. Direct regulation is generally considered the policy instrument of 
choice only if the regulator has vast quantities of information regarding the risk 
being regulated. Because of their increased access to information regarding insured 
risks, insurers are uniquely suited to engage in private direct regulation. Insurers, 
for example, could inspect their insureds’ activities and recommend specific steps 
that the insureds should take to reduce the risks that they pose to themselves and 
to others. Moreover, insurers could give those recommendations teeth by linking 
them to premium adjustments or by making them a condition of coverage. 
Although insurers do engage in some direct regulation (as discussed in more 
detail below), they do surprisingly little of it given the potential benefits. One 
 
2. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF 
THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 19, 155–56 (1992) (discussing incentive-based regimes vis-à-vis 
command-and-control and performance-based forms of regulation). 
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possible explanation for this restraint is surprising as well: insurers’ incentive to 
engage in direct regulation of their insureds’ risky behavior may be inhibited by 
concerns about direct tort liability. Under well-accepted common law principles of 
tort, if a party undertakes to render a service that is expected to reduce the risk of 
harm to a third party, the party providing the service has a duty to take reasonable 
care in engaging in this undertaking.3 Some states have passed legislation to 
eliminate this duty as it applies to insurance companies or to categories of 
insurance companies, such as workers’ compensation insurers.4 Most states, 
however, have no such “insurer Good Samaritan laws,” but have chosen to leave 
the common law cause of action in place; this is sometimes referred to as the tort 
of “negligent inspection.”5 What’s more, in most of those states, liability for 
negligent inspection has in fact been applied to insurance companies. Therefore, 
existing tort doctrine in most states poses an actual risk to insurers who engage in 
direct regulation of their insureds: if they regulate but do so poorly, they may be 
held responsible for the consequences. 
Whether exposing insurers to such tort liability is a good thing depends on 
tradeoffs that are familiar to the economic analyst of law. On the one hand, it can 
be argued that exposing insurers to negligent-inspection liability has at least two 
potentially negative effects: (1) insurers are discouraged from engaging in a 
socially-desirable form of risk regulation; and (2) insurers who do engage in such 
regulation find it necessary to raise their premiums to cover increases to their own 
direct tort liability, thereby pricing some insureds out of the market for coverage. 
If these two effects are large, perhaps more states should enact insurer Good 
Samaritan laws. On the other hand, applying the negligent inspection rule to 
insurers enhances efficient deterrence by providing insurers who undertake to 
provide safety inspections the incentive to do so with reasonable care; the market 
alone does not provide this incentive, for reasons discussed below. If this 
incentive is an effective deterrent to substandard inspection, perhaps the existing 
insurer Good Samaritan statutes should be repealed. 
Of course, enactment or repeal of insurer Good Samaritan statutes are not 
the only two options—there are both more extreme and less extreme alternatives. 
For example, if it is the case that insurers are in the best position to prevent 
certain accidents from happening—if insurers are the “cheapest cost avoiders”—it 
is conceivable that courts or legislatures could create an affirmative duty to 
regulate on the part of insurers by providing specific safety recommendations or 
mandates when doing so would constitute reasonable care. Such a rule could be 
seen as a major expansion of traditional tort liability, which generally imposes no 
 
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
42 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The Third Restatement is a revision of the language from the Second 
Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
4. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 579 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Mich. 1998). 
5. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11759 (West 2005); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-207 
(West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-500 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-
411 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assembly). 
Logue_Post Production read v2 PC Clean Up (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 7/1/20169:37 AM 
2015] ENCOURAGING INSURERS TO REGULATE 1359 
affirmative “duty to rescue” others who are in danger, even when doing so would 
impose little risk to the rescuer.6 Alternatively, a duty imposed on insurers to 
regulate could instead be seen as a hybrid of the existing exception to the no-duty-
to-rescue rule—namely, the exception for situations in which the tort defendant 
has a “special relationship” with the victim. 
This Article explores all of these possibilities. Part I provides a detailed 
discussion of why insurers might be viewed as effective private-sector regulators 
of the risks posed by their insureds. Part II surveys the existing doctrine dealing 
with negligent inspection liability, as applied both to trade associations and 
insurance companies—both examples of private risk regulators. Part III addresses 
the normative questions: How would insurers respond to various alternative tort 
rules with respect to direct regulation by insurers of their insureds, and what rule 
or combination of rules would create the optimal incentive structure? This Article 
builds on a number of literatures, including the previous work on trade association 
and insurer liability for negligent standard setting and negligent inspections,7 as 
well as the literatures on vicarious liability, gatekeeper liability,8 and the duty to 
rescue.9 
I. INSURERS AS PRIVATE REGULATORS 
Economic theories of regulation seek to identify the situations in which 
market failures create a need for government intervention in the economy, as well 
as what sort of interventions make the most sense; this could be command-and-
control regulations, performance standards, cost-internalizing taxes, or some 
combination.10 Whatever form of regulatory intervention is chosen, effective 
 
6. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980) 
(“No observer would have any difficulty outlining the current state of the law throughout the 
common-law world regarding the duty to rescue. Except when the person endangered and the 
potential rescuer are linked in a special relationship, there is no such duty.”). 
7. Two important articles on the liability of trade associations are Peter H. Schuck, Tort 
Liability to Those Injured by Negligent Accreditation Decisions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 
185; and Ralph G. Wellington & Vance G. Camisa, The Trade Association and Product Safety Standards: Of 
Good Samaritans and Liability, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 37 (1988). There have been a number of articles 
written on negligent inspection liability of insurers. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Tort Liability for 
Negligent Inspection by Insurers, in 2 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 65, 76 
(Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., ed., 1980); John Dwight Ingram, Liability of Insurers for Negligence in Inspection of 
Insured Premises, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 623 (2002); Amy Schulman, Recent Developments in Self-Insurance and 
Risk Management, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 479 (1996); Michael Braden, Comment, An Insurer’s Liability to 
Third Parties for Negligent Inspection, 66 KY. L.J. 910 (1977); James F. Reddoch, Jr., Comment, Insurer’s 
Liability for Negligent Performance of Voluntary Safety Inspections, 3 CUMB.-SAMFORD L. REV. 118 (1972). 
8. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 57 (1986); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 
1231 (1984). 
9. See, e.g., William H. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other 
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Saul Levmore, Waiting for 
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 
879 (1986). 
10. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–35 (1982). 
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regulation requires that the regulator have enormous amounts of information 
about the behavior of the parties being regulated and the consequences of that 
behavior. After all, the regulator must identify the optimal standards of conduct 
and the appropriate penalties for breaching those standards, both of which are 
information-intensive inquiries. This is why economic theories of rule making 
focus on the comparative abilities of different regulatory institutions—courts as 
compared with agencies, for example—to gather and process risk-relevant 
information.11 
Effective regulation also requires proper motivation: the regulator must have 
an incentive to produce and enforce regulations that maximize social welfare. 
Many, perhaps most, individuals who work for government agencies generally 
have such an incentive, but this is not always the case.12 In fact, it is almost a 
cliché to point out that regulatory agencies often have incentives that do not align 
perfectly with the public interest.13 For example, agency capture is a persistent 
problem, although its pervasion may be exaggerated. This is especially true in 
situations in which the regulated parties are relatively few in number, have 
relatively homogeneous interests, and are relatively well-off, while the beneficiaries 
of the regulation are the diffuse public.14 In such situations, government agencies 
can have a tendency to regulate primarily in the interest of the parties they are 
regulating, which may well conflict with regulations that would maximize overall 
social welfare. Moreover, even without agency capture, agencies lack the 
motivation from market forces that drives private firms to efficient solutions. 
Many commentators have noted that insurance companies can and do act as 
regulators of risk.15 Building on this scholarship, Omri Ben-Shahar and I have 
 
11. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 502, 510–11 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Steven Shavell, A 
Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271, 274 (1984); Steven 
Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 259–65 (1993). 
12. See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 9 (2008). 
13. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
335, 339–41 (1974). 
14. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4–
5 (1971). 
15. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 57 (1986) (coining the term “surrogate regulation” when describing the (then new) 
regulatory role being foisted on liability insurers to regulate toxic tort and environmental risks); 
DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 10 
(2002); Tom Baker, Bonded Import Safety Warranties, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 215, 216–22 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) (arguing for reliance on 
insurers to police food safety); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, First-Party Insurance Externality: An 
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 145–53 (1990) (arguing for 
shifting the regulatory function of product safety to products-liability insurers through adoption of 
strict products liability); Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-
Visited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 48–60 (2002) (arguing for use of insurance to regulate accuracy 
of financial statements); Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 120–22 
(1982) (exploring the relationship between tort law and insurance and how insurance has potential to 
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argued that insurance companies, in some settings, have a comparative advantage 
over government regulators of risk, due to both information and motivation 
asymmetries.16 The informational advantage that insurers have results from the 
nature of private insurance markets. Because insurers are providing risk-shifting 
and risk-distributing services to their insureds, they need to keep track of risk-
relevant data to price their products efficiently. This information is gathered at the 
underwriting stage (when the insurer must decide whether to insure a particular 
party, and at what price) and at the claims stage (when the insurer decides whether 
and how much to pay out for each claim that is filed). Each insurer has its own 
data specific to its own pool of insureds, and the industry accumulates 
information through institutions called insurance “rating bureaus,” or “rating 
agencies.”17 
This is the sort of information that a regulator would obviously find useful. 
Indeed, such information—about the risks presented by particular insureds, and 
about the effect on those risks of the insureds’ choices and actions—is arguably 
essential to effective regulation. What’s more, such information is costly to collect. 
Assuming insurers must collect the information in any event, it would be entirely 
duplicative and wasteful to have government regulators independently gather the 
very same information. This does not mean that the government should not also 
gather risk-related information. Rather, the point is simply that for those risks that 
have a competitive, individually underwritten insurance market, private insurers 
will aggregate risk-related information; it would not be cost-effective for the 
government to duplicate it. 
Insurers also specifically invest resources to identify the best ways for 
insureds to reduce their losses. For example, a group of large property/casualty 
insurance companies have historically operated a research institute that tests and 
rates the crashworthiness of automobiles; these tests produce information that is, 
or can be, used by consumers in determining which cars to buy.18 More recently, 
other insurers have begun a similar inquiry into risks of damage to property, 
especially damage from disasters.19 In both of these cases, the information that is 
generated is shared with consumers generally and, in some cases, with policy 
makers. These types of safety research and development initiatives are not unique 
to insurance companies and are sometimes replicated by the government. 
 
create optimal accident-prevention incentives). For a detailed proposal to privatize the regulation of 
medical care that raises many of the same arguments that have been raised in support of using private 
insurers as regulators of risk more generally, see Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 543 (2011). 
16. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 1, at 228. This Part draws heavily from this Article. 
17. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Toward a Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 82 
VA. L. REV. 895, 903–05 (1996) (explaining rating bureaus or agencies). 
18. See, e.g., Fatality Facts: General Statistics, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY-HIGHWAY LOSS 
DATA INST., http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-
facts [https://perma.cc/UV2L-V872] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
19. See INS. INST. FOR BUS. & HOME SAFETY, https://www.disastersafety.org [https://perma.cc/
2XRG-6UMB] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
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Nevertheless, they contribute to the overall stock of information that insurers 
have, which no other institution can claim. 
Insurance companies also have a strong incentive to help their insureds 
reduce risks; this is an incentive that government agencies do not have, and that is 
mostly consistent with the public interest. Liability insurers, for example, are on 
the hook when their insureds negligently cause harm to others. Therefore, the 
insurer that fails to find the most cost-effective way to reduce the risks posed by 
its insureds, and thereby to reduce the premiums it charges, may find itself losing 
customers to its more innovative competitors who can offer cost savings. Even 
absent strong competition among insurers, an insurance company has an incentive 
to maximize its own profits by minimizing its costs, which means finding ways to 
reduce the expected payouts to insureds after collecting the premiums. 
Besides their unique access to information and their competitive motivation, 
insurers also have access to a number of especially effective regulatory tools.20 For 
example, insurance contract terms that impose some portion of every loss on 
insureds themselves, such as copayments and deductibles, can be understood as 
devices to align insureds’ accident-prevention incentives with those of their 
insurers. Similarly, exclusions impose the entirety of certain types of losses on 
insureds; these are often losses from particular types of excluded causes, such as 
intentional wrongdoing. While the ex post effect of such exclusions can be 
draconian (i.e., total loss of coverage), the ex ante effect is to strongly incentivize 
insureds not to engage in certain types of behavior—such as intentionally causing 
the loss.21 
One of the most powerful regulatory tools insurers wield is the insurance 
premium itself. Profit-maximizing insurers seek to charge premiums correlated to 
the expected costs of the individuals and firms they insure—that is, premiums 
which are differentiated based on the risks presented by each insured. Failure to 
charge risk-differentiated premiums can result in the loss of low-risk customers 
who will find paying the blanket premiums to be a bad deal. Such low-risk parties 
may shift to competing insurers who have priced their policies with more 
accuracy. Alternatively, depending on how risk-averse the parties are and how 
inaccurate the premiums are across the market, they may opt for being self-
insured or uninsured. The departure of low-risk insureds from an insurance pool 
then leads to higher average costs for the remaining pool participants, which can 
 
20. Other scholars have pointed this out. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability 
Insurance & the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS 
OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., reprt. 2009) (identifying and 
categorizing the various methods of regulation used by insurers); Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made 
Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541 (2009); Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based 
Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. 325 (2011). 
21. Most modern insurance policies contain some sort of exclusion for losses caused 
intentionally by the insured. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (3d ed. 2013). 
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then induce additional lower-cost insureds to leave the pool. And so on until, in 
the worst-case (though perhaps unlikely) scenario, the insurance pool “unravels” 
entirely.22 To prevent all of this from happening, insurers attempt to charge 
premiums that are sensitive to the risks posed by particular insureds.23 And when 
an insured’s risks change over time, so must the insurer’s premiums. Such 
premium adjustments are based on experience rating, which takes into account the 
losses of particular insureds during the previous contract period, and preloss risk-
rating based on information about insureds that is gathered during the initial 
underwriting or renewal process. 
The economic-efficiency benefit of risk-differentiated premiums has to do 
with cost internalization. That is, to the extent insurance premium differences 
reflect risk-related choices made by insureds—so that insureds can, by altering 
their behavior, reduce or increase their insurance premiums—those premiums 
operate as a sort of cost-internalizing Pigouvian tax, not unlike a pollution tax. 
Insureds, because of their obligations to pay the premiums, are forced to realize 
the full social costs of their decisions, which they might otherwise externalize. 
Similar cost internalization can be achieved by insurers with deductibles and 
copayments. These are contractual provisions that leave insureds responsible for 
covering some portion of their insured losses. Economists have long known that 
such cost sharing can be efficient in insurance contracts, precisely because 
perfectly individualized and risk-adjusted insurance premiums are not possible, 
given the amount of information that would be required.24 A deductible 
automatically forces the insured to internalize some of the costs of their activities, 
up to the amount of the deductible. Thus, an insurance contract that contains a 
deductible can induce an insured to take particular steps to reduce risks, even 
when the insurer is not able to monitor the insured’s behavior. Deductibles work 
best for small but highly effective care level investments: for example, an insured 
can virtually eliminate a particular risk (and thus virtually eliminate the risk of 
having to pay the deductible) by making a minor investment in accident 
prevention.25 
 
22. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1577 
(1987). There is a strong case to be made that this sort of “death spiral” unraveling is rare and 
unlikely. See also Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1223, 1225 (2004). 
23. Note that this practice of risk-adjusted individualized premiums is consistent with the idea 
of risk shifting from insured to insured. That is, a risk-averse insured would rather pay an insurance 
premium that accurately reflects his or her particular risk than to bear the risk itself, assuming they 
can afford to pay the premium. That is what risk aversion means. 
24. Economists have famously noted that deductibles can be used to induce insureds to 
voluntarily sort into high-risk and low-risk groups when expressly risk-differentiated premiums are 
not practical. Thus, under certain assumptions, low-risk insureds would agree to a contract that 
contains a deductible but relatively low premiums, while high-risk insureds would prefer no 
deductible with a higher premium. The seminal article showing this result is Michael Rothschild & 
Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). 
25. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 
Logue_Post Production read v2 PC Clean Up (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 7/1/20169:37 AM 
1364 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1355 
In addition to incentive-based regulation through the use of premiums, 
deductibles, and the like, insurers also engage in some forms of direct safety input 
regulation. This is similar to what the EPA does when it tells a power plant how 
specifically to alter its practices to reduce emissions, or what OSHA does when it 
inspects a workplace and identifies safety improvements that need to be made. 
Insurers, especially liability insurers—workers’ compensation, products liability, 
and commercial property liability—are in a position to do this sort of inspection 
work reasonably well. As Victor Goldberg once put the point, “a tied sale of 
insurance cum inspection has very attractive properties. By tying inspection to 
insurance the parties in effect make the inspector’s compensation contingent upon 
its success.”26 
This regulation by insurer inspection developed first with boiler and 
machinery first-party coverage (discussed further below), but insurer inspections 
now are used to some extent across several types of coverage. Most large 
property/casualty insurance companies have a division whose primary job is to 
educate insureds about how to reduce risks. These services have a number of 
different titles: “loss control,”27 “ loss prevention,”28 “risk control,”29 or even 
“risk engineering.”30 
I have just laid out the most optimistic version of the insurance-as-regulation 
story. The truth is more complex, of course, and considerably less rosy. While 
insurance companies have some comparative advantage as risk regulators in 
certain settings, they also have limitations. First, unlike a government agency, an 
insurance company cannot compel its insureds to act under the threat of force; 
insurers have only the threats of premium increases, coverage cancelations, or 
other contractual remedies at their disposal. Second, those contractual remedies 
are not universally used. Although some insurers adjust premiums based on their 
insureds’ risky choices, others do not or do so only minimally because of high 
 
71 (2012) (explaining how deductibles can induce insureds to make low-cost, risk-reducing changes in 
behavior). 
26. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 72. 
27. E.g., Loss Control Services, FARMERS INS., http://www.farmers.com/business/loss-control 
[https://perma.cc/EQ62-5DL8] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); Risk Engineering: The Hartford’s Industrial 
Hygiene Laboratory, HARTFORD, http://www.thehartford.com/loss-control [https://perma.cc/RU5K-
7VXP] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); Smart Strategies that Help Manage Risk and Prevent Losses, BERKSHIRE 
HATHAWAY, https://www.bhhc.com/workers-compensation/services/loss-control.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/M2SN-BZ9L] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
28. E.g., Loss Prevention Services, AIG, http://www.aig.com/loss-prevention-services_3171 
_444286.html [https://perma.cc/CNB2-9KRY] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); Property ‘All Risks’ and 
Operating Losses, AIG, http://www.aig.com.kw/business/products/property/multi-risk-and-operating-
losses [https://perma.cc/8CFW-RFJP] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
29. E.g., Risk Control, LIBERTY MUTUAL INS., http://www.libertymutualgroup.com/business-
insurance/insurance-news/risk-management [https://perma.cc/9GZF-N4UQ] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2016); Risk Control, TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/risk-control/
index.aspx [https://perma.cc/UV9F-ASKD] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
30. E.g., Risk Engineering, ZURICH, http://www.zurichna.com/en/risk [https://perma.cc/
SA55-7VNF] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
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costs of information and transactions. Third, to the extent that insurance 
companies completely opt out of active involvement in the regulation of their 
insureds’ activities, insurance can have a counterproductive effect on incentives. 
Insurance can, and sometimes does, undermine incentives to reduce risk. It is 
common knowledge that insurance can produce moral hazard, and any attempt to 
use insurance as a form of regulation must take the possibility of insurer inaction 
into account.31 Fourth, with respect to liability insurance in particular, if the 
insured’s activity poses a risk of harm to others that exceeds the value of the 
insured’s assets (in which case the insured is said to be “judgment proof”), 
insurance cannot perform well as a regulatory mechanism unless it is accompanied 
with a coverage mandate. Fifth, and most obvious, the interests of insurance 
companies—even in reasonably competitive markets—can and sometimes do 
diverge from the interests of society generally. This is why insurance companies 
and insurance contracts are themselves regulated. For one example, bad-faith law 
is necessary to counteract insurers’ financial incentive to behave opportunistically 
with respect to their insureds in situations when market forces alone are not likely 
to punish such opportunism.32 Another example would be the problem of loss 
externalization by insurers through the use of annually renewed contracts.33 
For all of these reasons, it obviously does not make sense to rely solely on 
insurers as regulators. For some risks, government regulation is the only option; 
for others, perhaps there is no regulatory solution. But for some subset of risks, 
insurers’ incentives to minimize their insureds’ losses can be a useful supplement 
to government regulation. Moreover, insurers will almost inevitably make use of 
such incentives, so long as privately sold, individually underwritten insurance 
contracts are permitted. That is, so long as there are risk-averse individuals and 
firms demanding insurance coverage and competitive insurance markets 
responding to that demand, insurers will have an incentive to reduce their 
 
31. For the origins of the concept, see KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RISK-BEARING ( Julius Margolis ed., 1971); and Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 
BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). For its relevance to law, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: 
INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986); and Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
32. For a more in-depth discussion of the types of insurance regulation and their market 
failure rationale, see BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 21. In addition, to the extent liability law itself is 
vague or ambiguous, liability insurance companies and their representatives—as translators of that law 
for their insureds—will have a tendency to encourage their insureds to reduce their legal risk, not only 
by being more careful and thus reducing risk of harm to others (which enhances social welfare), but 
also by changing the way their behavior can be legally characterized and thus reducing liability risk 
without truly reducing risk of harm to others. See, e.g., Shauhin Talesh, A New Institutional Theory of 
Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 617 (2015). 
33. Insurance contracts usually last for only one year. As a result, any losses that the insured is 
likely to sustain in years after the policy has lapsed may be externalized, or ignored, by the current 
insurer. This effect is limited with occurrence-based liability insurance, which puts the insurer on the 
hook for any current or future claim arising out of “occurrences” that take place during the policy 
period. See, e.g., IOA Q&A, IOA INS. SERVS., http://www.ioapro.com/?page=faq#Q3 [https://
perma.cc/PX3X-4GBC] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). But even there, the insurer will tend to 
externalize post policy occurrences. 
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insureds’ risk levels, and thus will regulate subject to the qualifications listed 
above. The point of this section has been to summarize why this role of insurance 
should be accepted, and perhaps encouraged. 
There is a possibility, however, that existing tort law is indeed discouraging 
insurers from regulating, even when we should want them to. In the process of 
researching another article, I interviewed a number of officials at large property/
casualty insurance companies, and some of them stated that they are reluctant to 
get too involved in the safety-related decisions of their insureds because of the 
concern that their involvement will expose them to direct tort liability. This factual 
claim is impossible to verify without access to data that only the insurers have and 
that they generally are not willing to share with outsiders. The issue that can be 
explored, however, is the plausibility of the claim that tort law discourages insurers 
from regulating. This inquiry is taken up in the next Part. 
II. CURRENT LAW: THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT INSPECTION 
As it turns out, there is indeed a well-settled doctrine within American tort 
law that insurers who engage in the active regulation of their insureds’ behavior—
through inspection, instruction, standard setting, etc.—owe a duty of reasonable 
care not only to their insureds, but also to any other reliant third parties. To 
understand this rule, however, one must first understand the general no-duty-to-
rescue rule, to which the negligent inspection rule is an exception. The no-duty-to-
rescue rule is very simple to understand: there is no duty, generally, to rescue 
another who is in danger.34 So, if you come across a person who is drowning and 
could easily be helped without causing any risk for yourself (maybe you only need 
to toss the person a life preserver or call 911), tort law says that you may simply let 
the person drown and do not need to lift a finger or dial for help.35 To be sure, if 
you did not act, you would be a jerk, and at least one jurisdiction within the 
United States might fine you $100 for such egregious nonfeasance,36 but you 
would not be a tortfeasor in the eyes of the U.S. common law.37 
The no-duty-to-rescue rule has several well-known exceptions. First, if one 
party’s actions put another party at risk of harm, the first party may have a tort-
based obligation to provide assistance to the second, assuming the first party was 
aware, or should have been aware, of its role in creating the risk.38 In addition, 
 
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 37 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
35. E.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (finding no tort liability where the 
defendant rented a canoe to a drunken man and then later ignored the man’s calls for help as he was 
drowning). 
36. Vermont’s Duty to Aid the Endangered Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 1st Sess. of 2015-2016 Gen. Assembly 2015). 
37. The rule is different in a number of other countries. See, e.g., Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: 
A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 434–35 (1985) (discussing Europe’s 
adoption of the duty to rescue). 
38. Jennifer L. Groninger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the 
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there are a number of “special relationships” that courts have recognized as 
creating an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent harm to others.39 For 
example, courts have held that a common carrier owes something like a duty to 
rescue to its passengers, at least while they are in transit.40 Landowners 
traditionally owe a similar duty to invitees and licensees on their property.41 In 
addition, some courts have even found that special relationships between two 
parties (A and B) can create a duty in one (A) to prevent the other (B) from 
harming a third party (C).42 In such cases, the duty is owed, in a sense, by A to C. 
An example of this involves hospitals: in most jurisdictions, hospitals have an 
obligation to take reasonable care to prevent their patients from harming others. 
Taking this exception a step further, in the famous Tarasoff decision, the California 
Supreme Court recognized an affirmative duty on the part of mental health 
professionals to, under certain circumstances, take reasonable care to prevent 
obviously dangerous patients from harming others.43 Many other jurisdictions 
have since adopted this rule. Again, these special-relationship cases, to which we 
will return later in this Article, are important exceptions to the otherwise generally 
applicable no-duty-to-rescue rule. 
The other (and final) exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule takes us one 
step closer to the law imposing liability on insurers as regulators; this is the 
exception for voluntary undertakings. The quintessential example involves a failed 
rescue attempt. Specifically, if a person voluntarily renders aid to another who is at 
risk (the drowning stranger, for example), then the would-be rescuer has a tort 
duty to exercise reasonable care in attempting the rescue.44 The rule makes some 
sense. After all, if one person attempts to make a rescue, other potential rescuers, 
after seeing the first rescuer, may refrain from volunteering, which could make the 
rescuee’s situation even more perilous. As a result, it seems sensible that someone 
who is undertaking to rescue another should be encouraged by tort law to do a 
reasonably good job of it. I will have more to say about the wisdom of all of these 
rules later in this Article. 
The negligent undertaking exception was eventually extended to include 
private regulation of risky activities, including private regulation by insurance 
companies of their insureds’ activities. Under this rule, stated generically, if Party 
 
Street? What Is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999). 
39. Id. at 359–63. 
40. See, e.g., Yu v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 144 A.2d 56 (Conn. 1958). 
41. See, e.g., Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358 (H.L.) 370 
(appeal taken from Scot.) (discussing duties of landlords to trespassers, invitees, and licensees). 
42. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976). 
43. Id. at 343–44. 
44. See Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935) (“[I]f a defendant 
undertakes a task, even if under no duty to undertake it, the defendant must not omit to do what an 
ordinary man would do in performing the task.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, 
at 378 (5th ed. 1984) (“If there is no duty to go to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, 
there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse.”). 
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A undertakes, either for pay or voluntarily, to provide services for Party B, and 
such services are expected to reduce a risk faced by Party C, then A owes a tort 
duty to C to exercise reasonable care, provided that either B or C is relying on A.45 
This rule was tailor-made to manage private regulators. 
Consider first the example of trade associations as standard setters.46 Trade 
associations are nonprofits organized to represent the interests of firms in a 
particular industry. One important function of a manufacturing trade association is 
to promulgate product design and safety standards, which are then followed by 
manufacturers within the association. A manufacturer’s failure to follow the 
privately promulgated standard product safety standards can result in tort liability 
for the manufacturer; a failure to follow industry standards is considered relevant 
(though not dispositive) evidence of negligence or defective design. Therefore, 
standards enunciated by trade associations can be understood as a form of direct 
private regulation, similar to the direct regulation that insurers provide, as 
described above.47 
As a result of the negligent undertaking rule described above, the 
promulgation of private standards of care can also subject the trade associations 
themselves to tort liability. For example, in King v. National Spa & Pool Institute, Inc., 
an industry association set standards governing the type of diving board that can 
be safely used in with swimming pools of various depths and sizes.48 The court 
held that because the trade association voluntarily undertook a duty to exercise 
due care in promulgating safety standards, it had a duty to do so with reasonable 
care.49 There are many other such cases—trade associations from the chemical 
industry, the blasting cap industry, the window treatment industry, and the 
welding industry, among many others—that have been found to owe a duty of 
reasonable care to consumers when establishing industry standards of safety.50 
The same duty has been applied to hospital associations, associations of state 
school boards, and a wide range of other accreditation entities.51 Finally, under the 
same theory, numerous tort suits have been brought (successfully) against the 
Underwriter’s Laboratory, a safety research and certification organization. 
Underwriter’s Laboratory provides safety standards and inspections on a wide 
range of products, from household electronics and their component parts (wiring, 
 
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
43 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (with special emphasis on subsection (c)). A similar rule can also be found 
in section 342(a) of the Second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342(a) (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1965). 
46. The leading article on this topic is Wellington & Camisa, supra note 7. 
47. See generally Avraham, supra note 15, at 595–96 (making a similar point in the healthcare 
context, arguing for, among other things, a private-regulatory compliance defense where doctors sued 
for malpractice are following privately promulgated evidence-based guidelines). 
48. King v. Nat’l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 613 (Ala. 1990). 
49. Id. at 614. 
50. See generally Wellington & Camisa, supra note 7. 
51. Schuck, supra note 7, at 193. 
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circuitry, etc.) to fire extinguishers, smoke detectors, and other fire-protection 
technologies.52 
Clearly, tort law has been applied to encourage private standard setters to 
take reasonable care and to hold them responsible for failing to do so in setting 
private regulatory standards. Tort law is also being applied in much the same way 
to insurance companies. In fact, my research assistants were able to find 171 
reported negligent-inspection cases involving insurance companies, spread over 41 
separate jurisdictions. Of those cases, 107 involved workers’ compensation 
insurance, 33 involved some form of property insurance (often boiler-and-
machinery or equipment repair insurance), and the remainder involved other types 
of insurance. The remainder of this Part summarizes these cases by type. 
It is no surprise that the vast majority of cases involving negligent inspection 
by an insurer have to do with workers’ compensation coverage for two reasons. 
First, anecdotal evidence suggests that workers’ compensation insurers are among 
the most active direct regulators of their insureds’ risky activities. Second, workers’ 
compensation remedies are less generous than traditional tort remedies,53 which 
means that the injured party in a workers’ compensation setting is more likely to 
have sustained losses left uncompensated by insurance. 
The workers’ compensation negligent inspection cases share a similar and 
unsurprising fact pattern: a worker, or a group of workers, is injured or killed in a 
workplace accident as a result of an unsafe workplace condition.54 In these cases, 
in addition to the standard workers’ compensation claim brought against the 
employer, a lawsuit is brought by the injured victims against the workers’ 
compensation insurer, alleging that the insurer had inspected the workplace prior 
to the accident; that, in effect, the insurer deemed it reasonably safe; and that the 
employer-insured and the employees relied on this certification.55 In some of the 
 
52. See id. at 187. 
53. See generally JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 
260 (3d ed. 2012) (describing difference between workers’ compensation benefits and remedies 
available under tort law). 
54. See, e.g., Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058, 1059 (10th Cir. 1981) (grain elevator 
employees injured by explosion and fire); Adams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 494 So. 2d 401, 402 (Ala. 
1986) (employee injured when roller on an inspecting machine snagged); Burns v. State Comp. Ins. 
Fund, 265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (employee seriously injured at a sawmill that was 
negligently inspected by state agencies); Mimms v. Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.E.2d 825, 826 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1981) (employee injured when he fell off a piece of scaffolding from which safety rails had been 
removed); Jadosh v. Goeringer, 275 A.2d 58, 59 (Pa. 1971) (employee’s fingers crushed while 
operating a hydraulic ram of a lug cover press). 
55. See, e.g., Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th Cir. 1987) (employee 
injured by scaffolding on a construction site inspected by employer’s insurance company); Bartolotta 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 115, 116–17 (2d Cir. 1969) (employees exposed to argon gas after 
insurance company inspected employer’s factory and equipment); Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, 
Inc., 779 P.2d 315, 316 (Alaska 1989) (employees killed in plane crash after insurance company 
negligently approved of working conditions allowing pilots to work longer than allowed by FAA 
regulations); Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 335 (Alaska 1980) (employees 
injured when sparks from tool caused an industrial fire after safety inspection undertaken by 
insurance company); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ill. 1964) (seven 
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cases there is evidence that the insurer had suggested safety enhancements that 
were in fact made, but in most of the cases, the evidence is unclear on this point; 
the facts reveal only that the insurer had not raised objections to the injuring 
condition of the workplace before the injury.56 
The key issue in many of the cases is the question of reliance.57 The insurer 
typically argues that the safety inspection was not made “for the benefit” of the 
employer-insured or for the benefit of the employees of the insured but rather 
was exclusively for the benefit of the insurer. Specifically, the insurer contends 
that it engaged in safety inspections solely to determine whether to offer the 
insurance and, if so, under what terms.58 The relevance of this fact, as mentioned 
above, is that because the inspection was solely for the benefit of the insurer, no 
one else relied or should have relied on the inspection. Some courts have found 
this argument and the evidence in support of it to be persuasive.59 Other courts, 
however, have found that if the insured or other third parties in fact relied on the 
insurer’s safety inspections, the insurer owes a duty of reasonable care, regardless 
of whether the insurer was motivated primarily or even exclusively by minimizing 
its own risk under the policy.60 In all cases, the issue of reliance is crucial. 
 
employees killed and twelve employees injured when construction platform fell six stories after 
negligently inspected by insurance company). 
56. See, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1970) (insurance 
company recommended that hotel fix hazards, which hotel relied upon to rectify hazards); Patton v. 
Simone, 626 A.2d 844, 848 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (insurance carrier supplied company with list of 
recommended improvements, which company made, that did not include elevator in violation of 
building codes). 
57. See, e.g., Phillips, 813 F.2d at 1174–75 (whether or not employer relied on insurer’s safety 
inspection is a jury question); Hill, 428 F.2d at 116 (insurance company created reliance by indicating 
they would carry out safety inspections); Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256, 259 (E.D. 
Pa. 1982) (insurer can be held liable if inspections had been carried out negligently and then relied 
upon by employer); Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 610, 615–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) 
(whether or not employee relied on insurer’s safety inspections is a jury question); Derosia v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 881, 886 (Vt. 1990) (insurer liable where employee relied on them for 
expertise in safety matters and where inspections are undertaken for benefit of the insured). 
58. See, e.g., Manker v. Zurich Servs. Corp., 556 F. App’x 907, 907–08 (11th Cir. 2014) (argued 
inspection only for purposes of underwriting assessment); Heath v. B.J. Hughes, Inc., 431 So. 2d 68, 
69 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (argued inspection done for fulfillment of insurance contract, not for benefit 
of employees); Jansen v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 589 N.E.2d 379, 380 (N.Y. 1992) (argued 
inspections carried out solely for underwriting process); Schultz v. Mills Mut. Ins. Grp., 474 N.W.2d 
522, 526–27 (S.D. 1991) (argued inspections carried out solely for insurer’s benefit). 
59. See, e.g., Manker, 556 F. App’x at 909 (holding insurance company not liable where it “did 
not undertake to render services to another which it should have recognized as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things”); Heath, 431 So. 2d at 69 (holding insurance company not 
liable where “policy language makes it clear that the inspections were made only in connection with 
the contract of insurance, and not for the benefit of plaintiff”); Jansen, 589 N.E.2d at 380 (holding 
insurance company not liable where “it is apparent that the safety inspections were undertaken solely 
for defendant’s own underwriting purposes”). 
60. See Kohr, 534 F. Supp. at 259 (“The completeness and accuracy of the studies which [the 
company] received from [the inspector] and their degree of reliance thereon are all material issues of 
fact obstructing summary judgment.”); Nelson, 199 N.E.2d at 776 (insurance company promoted 
safety inspections as benefitting company’s clients, which “fully negates any concept that defendant’s 
gratuitous inspections were solely for its own internal purposes”). 
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In some of these workers’ compensation cases, the insurer seeks expressly to 
avoid negligent inspection liability by referring to language in the policy that 
explicitly disclaims any duty to the insured or to third parties in connection with 
the insurer’s inspections of the insured’s property or premises.61 This language, 
which is an obvious reference to the language found in both the Second and Third 
Restatements of Torts, as well as in the negligent undertaking cases, is routinely 
enforced by some courts, irrespective of whether the employer-insured did in fact 
act in reliance on the insurer’s inspections.62 Other courts have viewed such terms 
with more suspicion. Some have enforced such terms only if there was in fact no 
evidence of reliance by the employer or the third-party victim.63 Others have 
refused to enforce them at all when third-party victims are involved.64 A few have 
declared such terms void as against public policy.65 
The second most common type of negligent inspection cases brought against 
insurers besides the workers’ compensation insurance cases are disputes involving 
various types of property insurance, especially boiler and machinery coverage.66 
This also is unsurprising, as insurers who offer boiler and machinery coverage 
heavily advertise their loss control expertise, which enhances the case for 
 
61. See Tomasich v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 470 So. 2d 191 (La. Ct. App. 1985) for the 
language from an old US F&G workers’ compensation policy (“The Company and any rating 
authority having jurisdiction by law shall each be permitted but not obligated to inspect at any 
reasonable time the work places, operations, machinery and equipment covered by this policy. 
Neither the right to make inspections nor the making thereof nor any report thereon shall constitute 
an undertaking on behalf of or for the benefit of the Insured or others, to determine or warrant that 
such workplaces, operations, machinery or equipment are safe or healthful, or are in compliance with 
any law, rule or regulation.”). 
62. Louisiana is one example. Id.; see also Leroy v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. 
Co., 695 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (D. Kan. 1988) (court held insurance company not liable, following 
reasoning of Smith case below); Smith v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 303 N.W.2d 702, 715 (Mich. 1981) 
(insurance policy disclaimed liability for inspections and court held “[t]he insurer was entirely justified 
in so limiting its liability”); Rosenhack v. State, 447 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1982) (“The facts 
clearly and unequivocally lead to the conclusion that this contract for insurance and in particular the 
provision dealing with inspection of the premises specifically exclude claimant.”). 
63. See, e.g., Bussey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 643 F.2d 1075, 1076 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming the 
insurance company was not liable because defendant “did not establish the requisite degree of reliance 
by himself or his employer on the insurer’s inspection services”); Stacy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding the policy language where there was no reliance by the insured or 
injured workman on the inspections made by the insurance company). 
64. See, e.g., Van Winkle v. Am. Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 19 A. 472 (N.J. 1890); Sheridan v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 100 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1940). 
65. Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 752 F. Supp. 989, 997 (D. Kan. 1990). 
66. See, e.g., Manker v. Zurich Servs. Corp., 556 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014); Howell v. 
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1993); Hartford Steam Boiler 
Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 F. 617 (7th Cir. 1912); Indus. Risk Insurers v. New 
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1987); Mueller v. Daum & Dewey, Inc., 636 F. 
Supp. 192 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Blalock v. Syracuse Stamping Co., 584 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1984); 
Phila. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Forge Co., 555 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1982); A.O. Smith Corp. v. 
Viking Corp., 79 F.R.D. 91 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Hassan v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 373 F. Supp. 1385 (D. 
Del. 1974); Huggins v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 304 S.E.2d 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Cleveland v. Am. 
Motorists Ins. Co., 295 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). 
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reliance.67 Boiler and machinery coverage is usually sold by insurers who specialize 
in such risks and in special policies separate from and in addition to general 
property insurance policies.68 The coverage is typically first-party only and insures 
not only damage to the machinery itself but also any resulting business 
interruption or other lost income.69 The triggering event is the “breakdown” of 
the machine itself and not some external force such as fire, wind, or water, which 
would be covered under the standard property policy.70 Indeed, what has 
traditionally been called boiler and machinery insurance is now commonly called 
“equipment breakdown insurance.”71 Damages are typically limited to the cost of 
repairing or replacing the broken equipment along with associated lost income to 
the business, similar to business interruption coverage.72 
The fact pattern in a standard boiler/machine case is straightforward: a boiler 
or other large machine on the insured’s business premises explodes and injures 
one or more individuals, possibly a tenant or some other customer. The injured 
individuals then bring suit against the insurer that issued the policy covering the 
malfunctioning equipment. The claim itself typically tracks the language of the 
sections of the Restatement dealing with negligent undertakings—the main issues 
again being the nature of the service provided by the insurer, and whether that 
service was for the benefit of the insurer or the victims.73 Insurers lose as many of 
these cases as they win. 
 
67. See, e.g., Boiler & Machinery, TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/
specialized-industries/boiler-machinery/risk-control.aspx [https://perma.cc/5TNX-NA58] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016) (discussing the “entire team of national board-commissioned engineers 
dedicated exclusively to servicing equipment breakdown business”). 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., TRAVELERS, ENERGY MAX 21 (2015), https://www.travelers.com/business-
insurance/specialized-industries/boiler-machinery/docs/CP6943EMAX21.pdf [http://perma.cc/
H4JX-SKSR]; ZURICH, BM-4-E, BOILER AND MACHINERY INSURANCE EXPLAINED (2009),  
http://www.zurichcanada.com/internet/can/SiteCollectionDocuments/Equipment-Breakdown/
Risk-topic2-BoilerandMachinery-insurance-Equipment-break-down.pdf [https: //perma.cc/CM6A-
ARHJ]. 
70. See Equipment Breakdown Insurance, TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/business-
insurance/specialized-industries/boiler-machinery/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/NJ5V-KG7F] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
71. See, e.g., Coverage Basics, MUNICH RE, https://www.munichre.com/HSB/products/agents-
and-brokers/equipment-breakdown-coverage/coverage-basics/index.html [https://perma.cc/36XY-
8UHS]  (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); Equipment Breakdown  Insurance, NATIONWIDE,  
http://www.nationwide.com/business-equipment-insurance-protection.jsp [https://perma.cc/SY6R-
GY6P] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
72. See, e.g., Equipment Breakdown, W. RES. GRP., http://www.wrg-ins.com/Commercial/
EquipmentBreakdown.aspx [https://perma.cc/CA29-XJ6Q] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
73. See, e.g., Howell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 
1993); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 F. 617 (7th Cir. 1912); 
Riverbay Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., No. 83 CIV 8271 (MJL), 1988 WL 52783 (S.D.N.Y. May 
18, 1988); Phila. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Forge Co., 555 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Cleveland 
v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 295 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & 
Ins. Co. v. White, 775 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Logestan v. Hartford Steam Boiler 
Inspection & Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Van Winkle v. Am. Steam-Boiler Ins. 
Co., 19 A. 472 (N.J. 1890); Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 730 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In 
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Some types of insurance have given rise to very few, if any, negligent 
inspection lawsuits against insurers, presumably because such insurers are 
engaging in relatively little direct regulation—or perhaps because the sort of direct 
regulation that is being done produces relatively small likelihood of a negligence 
claim. For example, there are few cases involving homeowners insurance, and the 
cases that have been reported involve claims adjusting rather than preloss 
inspections; in any event, these have almost uniformly favored insurers (on 
reliance grounds).74 There are essentially no auto-insurance cases.75 Neither of 
these is a surprise, under current insurance schemes. Homeowners insurers do not 
inspect homes and provide certifications of safety, in the way that workers’ 
compensation or boiler and machinery insurers do. Rather, the type of direct 
regulation that homeowners insurers provide tends to be very general and 
uncontroversial—the sort of clearly reasonable safety suggestions that, as noted 
above, are supported by actuarial evidence and may be tied to premium discounts, 
but that is not likely to create a cause of action. The same goes for auto insurers; 
discounting premiums for safe driving or for reducing the number of miles driven 
is not a safety inspection or a certification that the activity of driving is now safe. 
Whether there might be more tort cases brought against homeowners and auto 
insurers if the duty were expanded is a different question. 
Unlike auto and homeowners insurers, it is somewhat surprising that there 
are not more negligent inspection suits brought against products-liability insurers. 
In fact, I was able to find only one. In Deines v. Vemeer Manufacturing, Co.,76 the 
insured was a manufacturer of mechanical hay balers—a machine that cuts hay 
and then rolls the hay into large bales. The case arose out of a products-liability 
suit brought against the manufacturer and the insurer by an individual whose arm 
got caught in the baler’s compression rollers and, as a result, had to be 
amputated.77 The plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused by the unreasonably 
dangerous and defective nature of the design of the intake area of the baler, the 
operating manual, and the safety stickers on the side of the baler.78 
 
some cases, the courts have implied that the issue turns on the interpretation of a statute. For 
example, in Cassell v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), the court 
suggested that, if the insurer’s boiler inspection was conducted to satisfy a state labor law requirement, 
then it would have been for the benefit of the worker victims, rather than for the insurer’s benefit. As 
it turned out, however, there was insufficient evidence in the case to determine the precise purpose of 
the insurer’s inspection. 
74. See, e.g., GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 650 S.E.2d 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Hamill v. 
Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226 (Vt. 2005). 
75. The one exception that I could find was Ayers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 878 N.Y.S.2d 190 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that there is an issue of fact as to whether truck driver’s economic 
losses were caused by his auto insurer’s negligent inspection of his car). 
76. Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 752 F. Supp. 989 (D. Kan. 1990). 
77. Id. at 992. 
78. Id. 
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During the relevant period, the insured manufacturer had purchased product 
liability coverage from a large property/casualty insurance company.79 Part of the 
arrangement under the policy was that the insurer would inspect all of the 
equipment used by the manufacturer insured to make the balers. The insurer also 
reviewed the design of the baler itself, as well as the warning labels and operating 
manuals that the manufacturer sent with the balers to the purchasers. After these 
inspections were completed, the insurer made suggestions for how the insured 
manufacturer might enhance the safety of the baler. When making these 
inspections, the insurer utilized their loss prevention experts, who applied safety 
standards that had been adopted by various standard-setting industry groups—
including the American National Standards Institute, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, and the American Society of Agricultural Engineers. In 
addition to being a condition of coverage, the inspections were a selling point: part 
of the reason the manufacturer-insured purchased products coverage with this 
particular insurer was to gain access to the insurer’s advertised loss control service, 
including the on-site safety inspections. Indeed, the insured manufacturer did not 
employ any safety engineers of its own, nor did it conduct any independent safety 
inspections because it was relying on the services provided by the insurer. 
The court, when evaluating the plaintiff’s tort claim against the insurer, 
applied each of the three prongs of the negligent undertaking rule from the 
Restatement discussed above.80 The court held, first, that there was no evidence 
that the insurer’s inspection increased the risk beyond that which would have 
existed in the absence of the inspections.81 Hence, there was, as a matter of law, 
no liability under prong (a). However, the court then held that the insurer had in 
fact undertaken a duty owed to the plaintiff by the insured manufacturer—that is, 
the duty of designing reasonably safe products and the duty to warn of the risk of 
the product—and that the insured manufacturer had relied on the insurer’s 
inspections being reasonable.82 Thus, potential liability was found under prongs 
(b) and (c). 
The court rejected the insurer’s argument that the state’s product-liability 
statute, which limited liability in various ways, applied to the case; the court 
concluded that the statute was not intended to eliminate negligent-inspection 
liability.83 In addition, the court held that the provision in the insurance policy that 
purported to eliminate any duty of reasonable care to third parties (including any 
duty that might arise out of the safety inspections) was void as against public 
policy.84 
 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 993–97. 
81. Id. at 995. 
82. Id. at 995–97. 
83. Id. at 998. 
84. Id. at 997. 
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The Dienes-type situation likely happens with some frequency: liability 
insurers specialize in products-liability coverage, employing products-liability law 
experts as well as experts in product design, manufacturing, and labeling, and 
provide product-specific recommendations to relatively small manufacturing 
companies who do not have the resources to maintain such expertise in house. 
Indeed, for the same reasons that workers’ compensation and boiler/machinery 
insurers often provide rigorous safety inspections, one would expect that product 
liability insurers do the same. There are product liability insurers who do provide 
some such services, as evidenced by their web advertising85 and by anecdotal 
evidence from my own interviews with insurers. And yet, there are far fewer 
reported negligent inspection cases involving product-liability insurance than there 
are involving workers’ compensation or boiler/machinery-liability insurance. 
Some states, perhaps concerned that negligent inspection suits might result 
in higher premiums or withdrawal of coverage (or perhaps concerned that such 
suits will reduce insurer profits), have enacted statutes limiting such claims. 
Twenty U.S. states have enacted statutes that appear to be designed to limit 
negligent inspection suits generally, or to limit such suits against insurers in 
particular, or so the insurers argue.86 Some state courts have also sought to impose 
limits by interpretation of existing statutes. For example, courts in a few 
jurisdictions have applied the workers’ compensation statutes themselves (the 
statutes that create the workers’ compensation regime in a state) to provide tort 
immunity for workers’ compensation insurers.87 Most courts, however, have not 
so held.88 Regardless, the existing state statutes explicitly protecting insurers from 
 
85.  See, e.g., CHARTIS, PRODUCT LIABILITY LOSS CONTROL SERVICES (2010), 
http://www.aig.com/ncglobalweb/internet/US/en/files/Commercial%20Risk%20-%20Product%
20Liability%20Loss%20Control%20Services%20-%201%20pgr_tcm295-276525.pdf  [https://perma
.cc/PCZ6-PDKX]; Products Liability Services, CHUBB GRP. OF INS. COS., http://www.chubb.com/
businesses/cci/chubb2492.html [https://perma.cc/F7EJ-XDXW] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (LexisNexis 2007); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.30.055 (West 
2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-485 (2012); CAL. INS. CODE § 11759 (West 2005); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-41-104 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 440.11 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-2-6, 34-30-
17-2 (LexisNexis 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 85.20, 88.6, 517.5 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 167 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509 (Lexis Nexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 418.131 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2925b (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. 
WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2013); 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-7-2, 27-8-15 (2008); 28 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-36-7 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-108 (1999); TEX. LAB. CODE 
ANN. § 408.001 (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 622, 624(h) (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.475 
(West 2006). 
87. Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Am. Mut. Liab. 
Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1977); Horne v. Sec. Mut. Cas. Co., 265 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Ark. 
1967); Barrette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 246 A.2d 102 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1968); Jadosh v. Goeringer, 275 
A.2d 58 (Pa. 1971). 
88. See, e.g., Bryant v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1970); Mays v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963); Stacy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1216 (N.D. 
Miss. 1971); Beasley v. MacDonald Eng’g Co., 249 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1971); Newton v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 252 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). 
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negligent inspection liability have been enforced. These statutes can be seen as a 
type of insurer-specific “Good Samaritan” law. 
III. EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE TORT RULES FOR INSURERS AS PRIVATE 
REGULATORS 
A. The Full Coverage Scenario: When Disclaimers Should Be Enforced 
This Part examines the regulatory or incentive effects of the existing doctrine 
of negligent inspection as well as the effects of several alternatives to current law, 
as applied to both insurers and their insureds. To provide a baseline for the 
analysis, observe that if the insurer in question (the one doing the regulating) 
provides full coverage for the underlying liability, the optimal tort rule is probably 
the absence of any tort liability. In such a situation, which I will call the “full 
coverage scenario,” the insurer is contractually on the hook for the full amount of 
any such losses that arise. In other words, there are either no limits on the policy, 
or there are limits high enough to cover any conceivable losses. In that scenario, at 
least in theory, there would be no regulatory benefit in providing injured victims 
with a tort cause of action against the insurer. The incentive of liability imposed by 
the insurance contract itself should be sufficient to motivate the insurer to take all 
reasonable steps to help its insureds reduce risks through inspections and/or 
standard setting.89 Thus, the optimal rule in a full-coverage scenario, from the 
perspective of the effect on incentives, would be one of no liability on insurers for 
negligent inspection. Not coincidentally, a rule of no liability would also be 
desirable from the perspective of providing fair compensation, since the injured 
party, by assumption, is entitled to full compensation from the insurer. For these 
reasons, in a full-coverage scenario, if the insurance policy contains a term 
disclaiming or waiving any tort duties by the insurer to the insured, a strong 
argument can be made that such a term should be enforced by the courts. 
The only cases in which tort law has any potential role are those in which the 
coverage limit of the policy issued by the regulating insurer is significantly less 
than the damages that can be recovered through a direct tort suit against the 
insurer for negligent inspection/regulation. This divergence between insurance 
coverage and the potential negligent inspection remedy can happen in two general 
situations. First, there can be divergence when the insurance coverage in question 
does not cover the full losses that occur. This shortcoming can happen with first-
party insurance coverage (e.g., boiler and machinery policies that do not cover 
personal injuries) or with liability insurance coverage (e.g., products-liability 
policies that have low policy limits). Second, in the case of liability insurance in 
particular, there can be divergence between the insurance coverage and the 
potential negligent inspection remedy when the underlying liability regime (the 
 
89. One qualification to this conclusion is that insurance contracts tend to be written on an 
annual basis. Therefore, the contractual cost internalization would be limited to the risks of a single 
policy year. 
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regime creating the liability for which insurance is purchased) has substantially 
limited remedies. The primary example of this type of divergence involves 
workplace injuries where the workers’ compensation regime provides a 
substantially smaller potential recovery than a tort suit would. The remainder of 
this Part addresses both types of divergence situations. 
B. Divergence Type I: Less-than-Full Insurance and Judgment Proof Insureds 
The less-than-full insurance coverage situation provides the strongest case 
for imposing a tort-based duty on insurers. In the absence of such a tort duty, the 
insurer, in deciding how to regulate its insured (e.g., how rigorous to make its 
inspection; how detailed and comprehensive to make its safety recommendations; 
how insistent it should be about compliance with those recommendations), may 
be inclined to ignore any potential costs to third-party victims that would exceed 
the amount of coverage agreed to in the insurance contract. Those additional 
costs, which are beyond the coverage provided by the insurer, are simply not the 
insurer’s contractual responsibility. As a result, there is an externality of sorts, or at 
least a potential externality, as the insurer externalizes those beyond-coverage 
costs to the insured. 
To visualize this situation, consider an example in which a property insurer 
provides first-party equipment breakdown coverage for an insured’s boiler (for 
repair and replacement costs to the boiler in the event it breaks down), but no 
liability insurance coverage should the boiler explode. And for whatever reason, 
the insured either has no separate policy providing liability coverage for such 
events, or has liability coverage that expressly excludes harm resulting from 
exploding boilers. Assume also that there is a substantial difference between the 
optimal boiler inspection for the purpose of avoiding breakdown of the boiler and 
the optimal inspection for the purpose of avoiding injury to persons. The 
externality concern is that, absent a legal rule forcing the insurer to take into 
account the uninsured liability risk of the insured, the insurer will have an 
incentive to do only the property risk inspection and not the personal injury risk 
inspection when, in fact, both types of inspections were appropriate. And the 
failure to conduct the personal injury risk inspection may, in fact, lead to injuries 
to third parties, for which there is no insurance. Similarly, imagine a product 
manufacturer purchases a products-liability insurance policy with very low policy 
limits. In that case, the liability insurer might have an incentive to perform only a 
cursory inspection, or none at all, given its relatively limited stake in the insured 
manufacturer’s risk of liability; such an inadequate or nonexistent inspection could 
precipitate a design flaw that results in numerous injuries or deaths. In both of 
these situations, the insurer is externalizing the uncovered losses to the insured—
the party that purchased the boiler policy or the products-liability policy. 
A potential response to this conclusion is to suggest that there is, in fact, no 
externality. That is, so long as the losses are borne by the insurer or the insured, 
those parties—who are already in a contractual relationship with each other—can 
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negotiate to the efficient, Coasean outcome. If it makes sense for the boiler 
insurer to do a personal-injury-type inspection of the boiler (as seems likely), then 
the insured can pay a somewhat higher premium to the insurer in return for that 
service. The same principle applies in the products-liability example: even if the 
products-liability insurer is contracted for less-than-full coverage, if the insurer is 
in a better position (in terms of information) to provide a product-risk assessment 
than the insured itself is, the insured can contract for such services; this is 
desirable if the insured is potentially liable for any product-related injuries arising 
out of the use of its products. Moreover, the insureds, in both examples, will have 
an incentive to contract for such services. As a result, market forces—together 
with the underlying tort duty of the insureds—internalize any potential externality. 
The externality in these cases returns, however, when the insured party is 
judgment proof. A potential tort defendant is judgment proof when its assets, 
including its liability insurance coverage, are insufficient to pay for the harm that 
can be caused by its activities.90 When a party is judgment proof, tort law—ex 
post sanctions, generally—has limited usefulness as a regulatory tool, because the 
misbehaving party cannot be forced to pay an amount that exceeds the value of its 
assets. This is why it has been argued that government agency-based ex ante 
regulation is preferable when parties engaging in activities that pose risk to third 
parties are judgment proof.91 Still, there are reasons to prefer ex post sanctions 
and tort law, in particular, over ex ante government regulation. For example, ex 
post sanctions require significantly less information on the part of the regulator or 
court.92 To the extent such arguments in favor of ex post sanctions are persuasive, 
tort law has found ways to work around the judgment proof problem. 
The doctrine of vicarious liability is one example. Vicarious liability holds 
one party liable for the torts of another under circumstances in which the first 
party either (a) is the cheapest cost avoider or, more importantly, (b) is one of the 
cheapest cost avoiders and has sufficient assets to be motivated by the threat of 
sanction.93 The classic example is an employer’s liability for torts employees 
commit within the scope of their employment. The justification is two-fold: (1) 
employers may be in the best position to prevent certain types of employee torts 
(in part because of information available only to the employer, and in part because 
the employer may control access to certain risky instrumentalities—such as heavy 
machinery—that are available to employees), and (2) the employer, unlike the 
employee, is not judgment proof.94 
Similar cheapest-cost-avoider–defendant-insolvency arguments have been 
deployed to justify a specialized form of vicarious liability known as “gatekeeper 
 
90. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986). 
91. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 
(1984). 
92. See id. at 359. 
93. See Sykes, supra note 8. 
94. Id. 
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liability.”95 With gatekeeper liability, the party held vicariously liable is, obviously, 
the keeper of the gate—the party whose approval or certification is required by 
the party whose actions directly caused the harm. Maybe the best-known examples 
of gatekeeper liability arise in the context of corporate financial malfeasance. In 
such cases, by the time the harm is discovered, the parties who have been harmed 
(usually the parties who invested in the corporation without knowledge of the 
shenanigans) cannot recover for their losses from the defendant. Similarly, ex post 
sanctions against the offending corporation are ineffective, as the company has 
gone into bankruptcy. The Enron scandal is perhaps the most vivid example of 
this phenomenon, but the observation is more general: a regime of regulation that 
seeks only to punish the offending corporation after the fact may not be enough. 
For this reason, an argument can be made that the optimal regulator strategy 
in the context of corporate financial misbehavior includes, in addition to ex ante 
government regulation (e.g., SEC oversight), the extension of ex post liability 
beyond the corporation itself to the corporation’s lawyers, accountants, lenders, 
and underwriters. These gatekeepers are all, in a sense, private regulators with 
access to the relevant information regarding the corporation whose behavior 
needs to be regulated. Their stamps of approval are either legally or practically 
required for the regulated corporation to engage in the particular transactions that 
pose substantial risk to third parties (often unsophisticated investors).96 Imposing 
a tort duty on these private regulators will encourage them to take reasonable care 
in determining whether to certify the books of such regulated corporations; that is 
the regulatory effect of gatekeeper liability. 
All of these arguments concerning vicarious liability generally, and 
gatekeeper liability in particular, can be applied to insurers as private regulators of 
risk. In a sense, insurers’ negligent inspection liability can be thought of as a 
specialized version of vicarious liability. Empowering injured third parties to bring 
tort actions against an insurance company that failed to take reasonable care when 
doing a workplace inspection or product safety evaluation could have the same 
sort of beneficial incentives that respondeat superior has in the employment 
context: insurers could be induced to take steps to prevent accidents that their 
insured does not have sufficient incentive to prevent. Imposing a tort duty on 
insurers could induce them to account for costs that might otherwise be passed 
onto society as a result of the combination of inadequate coverage and a 
judgment-proof insured. 
 
95. Kraakman, supra note 8, at 53, 57 (justifying gatekeeper liability in part because of 
impossibility of imposing fines on “individuals or corporations more than the value of their net 
assets”). 
96. Id.; see also Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and 
Ideology, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2003); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 
(2004). 
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Moreover, insurers sometimes do act as gatekeepers, at least to some 
extent.97 Home mortgage lending and auto insurance were mentioned as examples 
in the introduction, but there are others. Businesses cannot legally operate without 
workers’ compensation insurance coverage, which is mandatory in every state 
(unless the business falls within certain statutory exceptions). Similarly, most 
businesses would find it practically impossible to function without other forms of 
property or casualty insurance. Many product manufacturers, for example, may 
find getting a loan to be very expensive, or even impossible, unless they can 
provide proof of adequate products-liability coverage. Likewise, businesses that 
are heavily dependent on some piece of property—a building or a large, complex 
piece of machinery—may have difficulty getting credit at reasonable rates without 
proof of insurance against the possibility of breakdown. In such cases when 
insurers function as gatekeepers, negligent inspection liability can be especially 
effective as means of internalizing costs often externalized as a result of judgment-
proof insureds. 
C. Activity Level Effects 
When vicarious liability induces an employer to increase monitoring and 
regulating employees’ risky activities, or gatekeeper liability incentivizes a financial 
auditor to increase scrutiny of a corporation’s books, these actions can be 
understood as the “care-level effects” of such rules.98 There are also “activity-level 
effects.”99 For example, when an employer is made subject to tort liability for the 
conduct of its employees, the employer’s costs are increased in much the same 
way that its costs would be increased if a new excise tax were imposed. As a result, 
the employer may end up hiring fewer workers, paying lower wages, or perhaps 
replacing some of its workers with contract labor in hopes of avoiding liability. 
Similarly with gatekeeper liability, if corporate auditors, attorneys, and 
underwriters are made liable for the financial fraud of the corporations to whom 
they provide advice and whose integrity they certify, they (the gatekeepers) will 
raise their prices, or cut back on the number of corporations they are prepared to 
certify, or both. Precisely how the costs will be divided between the employers and 
employees, or between the gatekeepers and gate-kept, depends on the relative 
elasticities of supply and demand in the relevant markets. But in any event, if the 
additional costs imposed by vicarious liability are real costs that would otherwise 
 
97. Others have emphasized the role of insurers as potential gatekeepers, especially in the 
context of corporate governance and financial disclosure. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 25, at 39; 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor 
Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2004). In all of these proposals, however, the idea has been to make 
insurers only contractually liable through financial insurance policies. So far as I know, no one has 
argued in favor of imposing tort liability on insurers who fail to take reasonable care in monitoring 
their insureds. 
98. Steve Shavell was the first to clearly draw the distinction between care level and activity 
level effects. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21 (1987). 
99. Id. 
Logue_Post Production read v2 PC Clean Up (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 7/1/20169:37 AM 
2015] ENCOURAGING INSURERS TO REGULATE 1381 
be externalized due to judgment-proof employees or agents generally, these 
activity-level effects should tend toward efficiency. 
The same sorts of beneficial activity-level effects could arise when insurers 
act as regulators or gatekeepers. Making the insurers subject to a potential tort suit 
for negligent inspection—just as exposing an accounting firm to the risk of 
liability for failure to take reasonable care in performing an audit—is akin to an 
excise tax on insurers and can lead them to substantially increase their premiums, 
in some cases beyond a point that businesses are willing to pay. The threat of 
negligent inspection suits will force the insurer to raise the price of its coverage to 
account for potential payouts far in excess of the stated policy limits. These 
negligent inspection surtaxes are most likely to occur when the risks posed by the 
insured’s business activities far outstrip the value of the company’s assets (for 
example, hotels with significant risk of fire; workplaces where employees are 
systematically exposed to dangerous conditions; or product manufacturers whose 
products could harm large numbers of consumers). In these situations, if 
insurance is effectively performing a gatekeeping function, some of these 
companies will be put out of business. That is, if they cannot persuade an insurer 
to provide them with coverage at a premium they can afford—and that the profits 
from their business can sustain—they will effectively be priced out of the market. 
That result would be efficient, at least in theory. 
D. Insurer Withdrawal from Regulation and the Relative Merit of Carrots and Sticks 
A potential difficulty with using tort law to encourage insurers to regulate 
reasonably, especially under the current rule, is the possibility that, facing the 
prospect of such liability, insurers will regulate in a way that is designed to avoid 
liability or, worse, will stop regulating altogether. As to the first possibility, recall 
that under current law, insurers can be held liable in tort for negligent inspection 
only if the insured or some third party relies on those inspections being done 
reasonably; if there is no reliance, there is no cause of action.100 In practical terms, 
this means that insurers will (and often do) insert language into their policies or 
promotional materials stating that any inspections or audits or other regulatory 
services are provided solely for the benefit of the insurer and are not to be relied 
upon by the insured or anyone else. Such statements amount to disclaimers of 
liability, which courts sometimes enforce, but sometimes do not. 
The problem with this outcome, of course, is that if insurance is to provide a 
useful regulatory function, there must be reliance. When insurers are better 
evaluators of an insured’s risky activities than the insured itself is, the insured’s 
reliance on the insurer’s recommendations is the most desirable outcome. That is 
the point: for the insured to have the most information about its risky activities. 
 
100. Subsection (c) of Section 43 of the Restatement limits negligent inspection liability to 
situations in which “the person to whom the services are rendered, the third party, or another relies 
on the actor’s exercising reasonable care in the undertaking.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 43(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
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Thus, permitting insurers to avoid liability by proving the absence of reliance 
would discourage insurers from engaging in potentially beneficial private 
regulation—the type that is relied upon by the regulated party. 
The more extreme response of insurers to the threat of negligent inspection 
suits is for them to stop inspecting and to stop engaging in direct regulation 
entirely.101 Again, under current law, insurers can be held liable in tort for 
negligent inspection only if they “undertake” to provide inspection services.102 
Thus, by simply refraining from any sort of safety inspections, or declining to 
provide any “loss control” risk-reduction counseling to their insureds, insurers can 
essentially eliminate their liability in tort for negligent inspection. It is this sort of 
withdrawal from regulation in extreme response to the threat of such liability that, 
according to anecdotal evidence, some insurers have been doing. 
One potential policy response to both types of insurer avoidance in their role 
as direct private regulator—their tendency to discourage reliance on their 
recommendations or to refrain from regulating at all—would be for more states to 
adopt what I have called insurer Good Samaritan statutes: laws that immunize 
insurance companies from lawsuits. By eliminating this negligent-undertaking 
liability, such laws create a legal environment in which insurers would have the 
freedom to engage in aggressive direct regulation of their insureds’ behavior, if it is 
called for, without fear of tort liability far in excess of their policy limits.103 These 
statutes are obviously analogous to the better-known Good Samaritan statutes in 
many states that protect certain individuals (usually limited to off-duty trained 
personnel, such as doctors and nurses) who voluntarily undertake to rescue those 
in imminent peril.104 Good Samaritan statutes generally, and insurer Good 
Samaritan statutes in particular, are a type of “carrot” approach to encouraging 
rescue. They provide a positive reward to rescuers—a subsidy of sorts.105 
The limitation of this particular carrot approach is, again, the problem of 
less-than-full coverage. That is, with the threat of liability removed, it is true that 
 
101. Indeed, this is the primary reason Professor Goldberg gives for his opposition to 
negligent inspection suits against insurers. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 76. 
 102.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 43(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
103. The statute in Maine, for example, reads as follows: “[T]he furnishing of, or failure to 
furnish, insurance inspection services related to, in connection with or incidental to the issuance or 
renewal of a policy of property or casualty insurance shall not subject the insurer, its agents, 
employees or service contractors to liability for damages from injury, death or loss occurring as a 
result of any act or omission by any person in the course of such services.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14, § 167 (1982). Another example is from California, where the state insurance law places strict limits 
on negligent inspection lawsuits. Section 11759 of the California Insurance Code states that “licensed 
rating organizations and their officers and employees shall not be liable for injury or death or other 
damage caused or alleged to have been caused by their failure to inspect, or negligent or incomplete 
inspection of, an employer’s location, plant or operation for classification or rating purposes.”  CAL. 
INS. CODE § 11759 (West 2014). 
104. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 53, at 83–88. 
105. Levmore, supra note 9, at 881 (coining the use of “carrot” and “stick” labels in this 
context). 
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insurers would no longer have an incentive to refrain from regulating their 
insureds or an incentive to discourage reliance on their recommendations—which 
lead to the same result. Rather, insurers would have an unambiguous financial 
incentive to regulate, but their incentive would again be capped by the limits of the 
insured’s coverage, the amount that the insurer has at stake if the insured suffers a 
loss. For this reason, whether the adoption of an insurer Good Samaritan statute 
would have, on balance, beneficial incentive effects on insurer behavior would 
depend on a comparison of (a) the efficiency gains realized from those insurers 
who are induced by the statutory protection to engage in some useful regulation of 
their insureds with (b) the efficiency loss from those insurers who would have 
regulated in any event but who now, with the threat of liability removed, will 
regulate less effectively on account of the divergence between policy limits and 
amounts at risk of loss. This is the externality problem discussed above. 
How these two factors balance out in the real world presents the 
quintessential difficult empirical question. My own intuition is that, all things 
considered, factor (a) is probably larger than factor (b), which means the adoption 
of insurer Good Samaritan statutes would be a sensible recommendation. 
However, if we consider tweaking the standard insurer Good Samaritan statute, 
we might achieve an even better outcome, in terms of the overall effect on 
incentives. Consider the possibility of adding a wrinkle to those statutes: make the 
insurer’s freedom from tort liability contingent on a finding by a court 
(presumably upon a motion by an insured to dismiss a negligent inspection claim 
brought against it) that the amount of insurance involved in the case was adequate 
to cover the risk posed by the insured. Such a contingency would give insurers an 
incentive to make sure that insureds are purchasing adequate coverage, which 
would push the market closer to the full coverage situation described above, 
where tort law would not be necessary to encourage optimal direct regulation by 
insurers. This solution would of course present additional complexities, perhaps 
the most difficult being how to define “adequate” coverage. But that question 
could be left to the courts (in individual negligent inspection cases, or perhaps 
through declaratory judgment actions), to the insurance regulators (who could 
promulgate standards of adequate insurance), or to state legislatures. 
A critic at this point might have the following complaint: “If higher 
insurance policy limits are the ultimate goal of this reform proposal, why not 
simply propose that state legislatures impose insurance mandates in areas where 
they have not yet done so, and increase the limits in areas where current mandates 
are too low? Once those are adopted, we would be close to a full coverage 
scenario, and the need to impose an affirmative tort duty on insurers to regulate 
would be eliminated.” There is something to be said for this argument. Many 
scholars have suggested mandatory liability insurance as a response to the 
judgment proof problem, generally.106 Likewise, broader use of insurance 
 
106. See, e.g., Peter-J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, 16 INT’L 
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mandates, as well as stronger existing mandates, could be a solution to this version 
of the judgment proof problem as well. However, expanding legislative insurance 
mandates is likely to be politically unpopular; on the other hand, the sort of statute 
envisioned in this Article is less intrusive than an actual insurance mandate. 
Insurers could still opt not to provide full coverage and simply risk the possibility 
of a negligent inspection suit. Moreover, at least in those states that do not 
currently have any insurer Good Samaritan statute, the modified form that I am 
suggesting could be seen as a compromise—a middle position between a no-
liability-limiting statute (the status quo) and a new liability-limiting statute that 
encourages, but does not actually mandate, higher policy limits. The proposal 
provides a more attractive carrot than the status quo but a less extreme stick than 
an expanded mandate. 
The alternative and considerably more radical policy response to insurers’ 
reluctance to regulate or withdrawal from regulation would be to eschew the 
(modified) carrot of (contingent) freedom from tort liability for the unambiguous 
stick: an affirmative duty to regulate. The idea would be to penalize those insurers 
who fail to regulate when they ought to by imposing an affirmative tort duty on 
them to engage in direct regulation of their insureds’ behavior when doing so is 
reasonable. Such a duty to regulate would clearly be a departure from current law. 
Moreover, it would arguably be inconsistent with the approach the law has taken 
to affirmative obligations in other contexts. The most obvious example is the 
general no-duty-to-rescue rule mentioned in the Introduction; the arguments that 
have been made in defense of that rule would similarly apply here. For example, 
William Landes and Richard Posner have pointed out that adopting an affirmative 
duty to rescue would encourage potential rescuers to avoid situations in which 
they might be called on to rescue.107 Picture off-duty doctors, nurses, and EMT 
workers avoiding swimming pools and public beaches.108 
What is the analog in the insurance context? Insurance companies refusing 
to offer insurance coverage to certain insureds for fear of being held liable in tort 
for failing to regulate every time there is a loss claim? That is one realistic 
possibility—some insurers may well decline to cover certain insureds or categories 
of insureds, based on their inability to mitigate certain risks. Other insurers, 
however, may continue to insure, but would start to engage in active regulation to 
minimize their insureds’ risks. Insurers would almost certainly respond by 
increasing the prices of their coverage to include the risk of a duty-to-regulate 
lawsuit. Perhaps even more likely, insurers might both raise their prices and insist 
on higher policy limits; if they are going to be taking on the risk of being held 
liable for amounts beyond their existing policy limits (under an affirmative duty to 
regulate), they might as well raise their policy limits and their prices. This change 
 
REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1996); Shavell, supra note 91. 
107. Landes & Posner, supra note 9. 
108. Id. 
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would again move the market towards the full coverage scenario, where the 
negligent inspection tort suit would be rendered irrelevant. 
Note also that imposing an affirmative obligation on insurers to regulate 
would not be totally without precedent. Recall the various “special relationship” 
exceptions to the general no-duty-to-rescue rule mentioned above. The idea of 
imposing this obligation on insurers would be to treat the insurer-insured 
relationship as being more akin to the business-premises-owner–business-guest 
relationship, the employer-employee relationship, or even the teacher-student 
relationship.109 A primary reason for these special relationship exceptions is that 
they provide a way to draw administrable lines in deciding who is potentially liable 
under this affirmative duty to rescue. That is, while it would be quite burdensome 
on the affected parties, as well as on the judicial system, to have an unrestricted 
affirmative duty to rescue, a rule that applies only to parties in certain enunciated 
categories of relationships is narrower, less burdensome generally, and easier for 
courts to apply. Imposing an affirmative duty on insurers to provide regulatory 
advice to their insureds when it is reasonable to do so could be seen as another 
example of a special relationship. 
But let’s not kid ourselves. Imposing a new affirmative tort duty on insurers 
to engage in reasonable inspections when it is reasonable to do so would be highly 
controversial. What’s more, if it worked, it would produce a result not entirely 
different from the modified (adequate-policy-limit-contingent) version of the 
insurer Good Samaritan statute that I suggested above. Both reforms would tend 
to push up the amount of coverage offered by insurers, thus helping to align the 
inspection-regulation incentives of insurers with those of society. The latter 
reform, however, would have two big advantages over the former. First, it would 
be less of a departure from current law and, as a political matter, less of an 
apparent imposition of costs on insurers, for the reasons described above. Second, 
it would require less regulation by courts in the business of insurance than the 
simple duty to regulate does. That is, if the insurer-modified Good Samaritan 
statute works as planned, there would rarely be a need for courts to hear negligent 
inspection cases against insurers, assuming insurers write policies with adequate 
coverage, since the insurers would be immune. By contrast, under the affirmative-
duty-to-regulate approach, courts would continually be called on to second-guess 
insurers’ regulatory judgments, both whether to regulate and how; this is a task for 
which courts are not necessarily well-suited.110 This limitation of the courts is of 
course not unique to tort suits against insurance companies for what amounts to 
negligent risk regulation. To the contrary, all negligence-based tort causes of 
 
109. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 53, at 83–88. 
110. This is, of course, not a critique unique to tort suits against insurance companies for what 
amounts to negligent risk regulation. To the contrary, a negligent-based tort cause of action that 
involves complex and technical issues of engineering and science present difficulties for courts. (Risk-
utility analysis in product design defect cases is similarly difficult for courts.) The point is that the 
critique would be less applicable to the insurer Good Samaritan statute alternative. 
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action that involve complex and technical issues of engineering and science 
present difficulties for courts: for example, risk-utility analysis in product design 
defect cases. The point is that the difficulty would be less problematic in the 
insurer Good Samaritan statute alternative. 
E. Divergence Type II: The Workers’ Compensation Example 
I noted above that negligent inspection liability against insurers only makes 
sense, even potentially, as a regulatory tool in situations in which the insurer 
provides less than full coverage. That is, there must be a divergence, a gap 
between the insurance coverage actually provided and the potential negligent 
inspection remedy. Until now, I have been discussing situations in which the gap 
arises because the insured purchases less than full coverage for the losses its 
activity might cause, whether for market reasons or for reasons having to do with 
being judgment proof. There is another source of coverage gap which applies 
primarily to workers’ compensation insurance but could likewise apply to any 
situation where the underlying liability regime (the regime creating the liability for 
which insurance is purchased) provides remedies for injured victims that are 
substantially less than those available through a tort claim. 
Consider the workers’ compensation example. When a worker is injured on 
the job, she does not have a traditional tort claim against her employer, even if she 
can prove that her employer’s negligence caused her injury. As a result of state 
workers’ compensation statutes, many of which were enacted in the early part of 
the twentieth century, a worker’s remedies are limited to partial recovery for 
medical expenses, lost income, and vocational rehabilitation cost; all of these may 
be subject to a cumulative cap.111 Note, then, that under a typical workers’ 
compensation regime today, neither pain-and-suffering damages nor punitive 
damages may be recovered by the injured worker.112 Contrast that outcome with 
the traditional tort remedies available in nonworkplace settings: those remedies 
include unlimited recovery for compensatory damages, including pecuniary 
(medical expenses, lost income, and the like) as well as nonpecuniary damages 
(pain and suffering) and, potentially, punitive damages.113 
Given this divergence, a proponent of tort liability as a regulatory tool might 
initially argue that the negligent inspection suit provides an especially useful 
regulatory tool for improving workplace safety. Since workers’ compensation 
remedies do not account for some of the real costs associated with workplace 
injuries (yes, pain and suffering is a real cost), the threat of workers’ compensation 
damages does not give employers sufficient incentive to maintain workplace 
safety. Imposing tort liability on workers’ compensation insurers when they fail to 
 
111. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE 
STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (2000). 
112. PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE (1998). 
113. Id. 
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do a reasonably effective workplace inspection, which results in an injury to a 
worker, serves a useful cost-internalizing function. 
Critics of tort law as a mode of regulation would have a number of familiar 
responses to this line of argument. Jury awards in tort cases, especially pain-and-
suffering damage awards, are inaccurate and wildly inconsistent, or so they would 
say. Critics would also point out that people do not generally purchase first-party 
insurance coverage for purely non-economic losses. Why is that fact relevant? If 
true, it would mean that when tort law forces insurers to raise their premiums to 
cover the possibility that they might be held liable through a negligent inspection 
lawsuit for the pain-and-suffering damages of some unfortunate person, the law 
will be making insureds pay for a type of insurance that they do not want. Finally, 
these critics would likely note that the main point of workers’ compensation laws 
was to eliminate the inconsistencies and excesses of tort liability (including pain-
and-suffering damages) in exchange for the elimination of several defenses that 
employers had at in common tort cases, such as the fellow servant rule. To permit 
injured third parties to recover pain-and-suffering damages from insurers for 
breach of the duty to provide reasonable inspections, when the same injured 
parties cannot sue the insured employer directly for the same damages, 
undermines the political and pragmatic compromise represented by the workers’ 
compensation law reforms.114 
The problem with the argument is that it gives greater scope to the workers’ 
compensation compromise than may be warranted. Although workers’ 
compensation laws were intended to limit remedies that employees have against 
their employers for workplace injuries, they were not intended to limit employees’ 
remedies against everyone. For example, if an employee is injured in the 
workplace by a product, perhaps some large piece of equipment, that employee 
can bring a products-liability claim or a negligence claim against the equipment’s 
manufacturer in addition to their workers’ compensation claim. And the damages 
available in the products-liability case, of course, are likely to include pain-and-
suffering damages. What’s more, this side-by-side coexistence—of the traditional 
tort remedies against product manufacturers and the more limited remedies 
against the employer—is not considered problematic, at least as a legal matter. 
Product manufacturers were clearly not a part of the bargain that produced the 
workers’ compensation regime, and they are not protected by workers’ 
compensation statutes.115 Likewise, workers’ compensation insurers were not part 
of that grand bargain. That is, at the time the workers’ compensation statutes were 
originally enacted, there is no evidence that they intended to limit independent tort 
remedies against workers’ compensation insurers who fail to take reasonable care 
when providing services to the insureds, although the lawmakers did contemplate 
 
114. See generally FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 111 (discussing political compromise 
reached between unions and employers). 
115. See Jonathan M. Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers’ 
Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1977). 
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that workers’ compensation liability insurers would provide workers’ 
compensation policies to employers to cover the damages that employers would 
be required to pay. Frankly, lawmakers were probably not thinking about that 
particular issue. As a result, it is no surprise that most, though not all, courts that 
have addressed the question have held that workers’ compensation statutes 
themselves, the ones that created the workers’ compensation regimes, do not 
immunize workers’ compensation insurers from negligent inspection liability.116 
Whether negligent inspection suits should be available against workers’ 
compensation insurers, then, turns not on factors specific to workers’ 
compensation coverage, but rather on the issues discussed above in connection 
with other types of insurance: the extent to which the presence of such suits is 
likely to discourage insurers from inspecting at all, and whether that effect would 
be greater or less than the effect of the rule on the quality of the inspections. 
Unlike with other types of insurance where the crux of the problem was 
insufficient coverage and the solution was to find a way to encourage insurers to 
offer full coverage, in workers’ compensation, the amount of liability and the 
amount of insurance coverage are both determined by statute and regulation. 
Therefore, the only way to increase the coverage, and thereby to eliminate the 
need and motivation for the negligent inspection suits, would be to reform 
workers’ compensation regimes generally to provide greater damages, including 
pain-and-suffering damages. Or, we take the reverse approach and reform tort law 
to be more like workers’ compensation. Either approach would likely eliminate the 
need for what amounts to vicarious liability suits against insurers. 
CONCLUSION 
Insurers have access to information that puts them in the ideal position to be 
effective private regulators of their insureds’ risky activities, and they have 
exceptionally effective regulatory tools at their disposal. Nothing motivates 
someone to change their behavior like a financial reward, perhaps in the form of a 
premium discount. And when insurers control access to certain domains of the 
economy—either because of legal or practical requirements—the ability to 
withhold coverage can induce insureds to follow the insurer’s recommendations 
for reducing potential losses. Moreover, because insurers are bonded to the 
interests of their insureds, as a result of their contractual obligation to pay the 
insureds’ claims, insurers are motivated by their own bottom line to find ways to 
minimize their insureds’ losses. For all these reasons, if tort law (particularly, 
negligent inspection lawsuits by insureds and third parties against insurers) is 
 
116. Compare Beasley v. MacDonald Eng’g Co., 249 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1971) (holding that the 
state’s workers’ compensation law, which prohibits lawsuits against employers, did not apply to 
negligent inspection suits against workers’ compensation insurers, even though the term “employer” 
was defined in certain situations to include insurers), with McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt 
Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding that the Colorado workers’ compensation statute 
immunizes workers’ compensation insurers from liability for negligent inspection). 
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discouraging insurers from engaging in some types of direct regulation of their 
insureds’ behavior, perhaps some insurers would respond to additional 
encouragement. This Article has argued that a modified carrot approach to 
providing such encouragement, where insurers are given immunity from tort 
liability if they provide adequate coverage limits, might be superior to a more 
radical stick approach, in the form of an affirmative duty to regulate. 
 
